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I. INTRODUCTION
It is impossible to overstate the importance of search engines
in today‘s online world. As Internet access becomes more
widespread, and the amount of information available in
*
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cyberspace becomes more voluminous, such informationgathering tools grow ever more valuable. Without a way to
efficiently sift through online data, Internet users would be
unable to locate and access the information they need.
Recognizing the importance of search engines to the public,
Congress placed safe-harbor provisions for ―information
location tools‖ into the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (the
―D.M.C.A.‖).1 Section 512(d) of the D.M.C.A. states that an
Internet service provider cannot be liable for merely using tools
like a ―directory, index, reference, pointer, or hypertext link‖ to
direct users toward a website that displays copyrighted works.2
This section indicates an attempt by Congress to balance the
needs of Internet service providers (―ISPs‖) and copyright
holders.
In the years since the passage of the D.M.C.A., however,
search engines have evolved at a rapid pace along with the rest
of the World Wide Web. Today, a search engine like Google or
Yahoo! is often the first tool people use when seeking
information online, a gateway of sorts through which all other
online activity arrives. As search engines have become
increasingly important to the average Internet user, many search
engines have begun to commoditize, adding new functions to
grow their customer base. For instance, the current incarnation
of the Google search engine not only allows users to find web
pages, but also allows them to search for image files, news
stories, blog results, products for sale in online stores, and
more.3 Search engine providers have also added specialized
search tools, which allow users to narrow their search to certain
specific subjects.4 Additionally, many search engines now host
their own material or cache third-party websites, allowing
Internet users faster and easier access.5 In a world where
copyrighted material is available through a link, search engines
may become liable for copyright infringement as they add new
features, which discourage growth and expansion.
One recently filed lawsuit, which brings all of these
1

17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (2006).
Id. Other qualifications apply and will be discussed infra Part II.B.
3
See Google.com, Help, Search Features,
http://www.google.com/help/features.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2009).
4
See, e.g., The Online Books Page, http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu
(last visited Oct. 15, 2009) (linking to online books hosted on other sites); Lotpro
Used Car Search Engine, http://www.lotpro.com/search (last visited Oct. 15, 2009)
(linking to local sites selling used cars).
5
See, e.g., Project Gutenberg, http://www.gutenberg.org/wiki/Main_Page
(last visited Oct. 15, 2009) (hosting online books as local content on its own server);
Google Help: Search Features,
http://www.google.com/intl/en/help/features.html#cached (last visited Oct. 15, 2009)
(describing how Google automatically caches third-party web-sites).
2
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distinctions into focus, is Warner Bros. Records v. SeeqPod,
Inc.6 SeeqPod is a specialized search engine that finds mostly
music-related results, such as for mp3s, music videos, or articles
on artists. The engine directs Internet users to third-party sites
using hyperlinks, and it provides a built-in ―playlist‖ feature,
allowing users to hear the results of their queries instantly. In
January 2008, Warner Brothers sued SeeqPod for copyright
violations, alleging the creators of the search engine knew that
the music found in search results was overwhelmingly
copyrighted material.7
By law, a search engine is sheltered from liability for
copyright infringement as long as it removes or disables access
to links that direct Internet users toward copyrighted material,
after a legitimate copyright holder sends notice that infringing
links exist.8 SeeqPod allegedly received notice from the
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) of
―thousands‖ of infringing links.9 Yet the heart of the plaintiffs‘
complaint is the assertion that notice is unnecessary for a musicoriented search engine because almost all playable music is
copyrighted in some way.10 According to the plaintiffs,
SeeqPod‘s creators should know better than to allow Internet
users to seek out and play back music-related search results.11
Clearly, the issue of whether search engines should be liable
for the copyright infringement of third-party websites is
contentious. As the first tool that most Internet users employ to
reach media and information on the World Wide Web, search
engines are uniquely situated to prevent or allow access to
unauthorized works on third-party sites. However, placing this
burden on search engines may generate unnecessary restrictions
on the navigation of online content and discourage the
development of new features like SeeqPod‘s ―playlist‖ function.
This Note argues that search engines deserve broad
protection from liability because it may otherwise be daunting
for such sites to provide sophisticated, specialized search
functions and to integrate new features that benefit the public.
Despite its puzzling terminology, the safe-harbor provision for
search engines in the D.M.C.A. is meaningful, and courts should
interpret it broadly. This Note argues, moreover, that even
without subscribers, search engines may still fulfill the
6

No. CV08-00335 (C.D. Cal. filed Jan 18, 2008).
Complaint at 2, ¶ 1, Warner Bros. Records v. SeeqPod, Inc., (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 18, 2008) (No. CV08-00335).
8
17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(3).
9
Complaint, supra note 7, at 16, ¶ 37.
10
Id. at 12, ¶ 29.
11
Id.
7
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conditions for safe-harbor treatment under the D.M.C.A., and it
suggests possible solutions to the problematic ―notice and
takedown‖ provisions of the D.M.C.A.
Part II gives a brief history of copyright law in the United
States and discusses the legal definition of a ―search engine.‖ It
explains the steps a search engine must take to protect itself
from liability for copyright infringement. Part III questions
whether the safe-harbor provision for search engines is at all
meaningful in light of how the terms in § 512(d) closely mirror
the standards for contributory and vicarious liability for
copyright infringement. It also examines whether search engines
must have a policy of control over users in the same way as
other service providers under § 512(i). Part IV argues that the
―notice and takedown‖ regime in the D.M.C.A. can be exploited
or abused, and it explores alternatives, which strike a better
balance between copyright holders‘ interests and the public
good.
II. THEORIES OF LIABILITY FOR
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND LEGAL
REQUIREMENTS FOR SAFE-HARBOR
PROTECTION UNDER THE D.M.C.A.
A. Brief History of Copyright Law and Theories of
Liability
The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to
―Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the Exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.‖12 The intent of
this provision is to allow the public access to ideas and products
that the creators might not otherwise have an incentive to
produce.13 This economic incentive to generate ideas and
inventions intends to benefit the public.
Pursuant to this Constitutional power, Congress enacted the
Copyright Act, protecting any ―original works of authorship
fixed in a tangible medium.‖14 A copyright holder has the
exclusive right to reproduce or distribute his work, to create
derivative works, and to publicly display or perform the
copyrighted work.15 Direct infringement of copyright occurs
when one personally violates one or more of these five
exclusive statutory rights without the permission of the
12
13
14
15

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1)-(6) (2006).
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copyright holder.16
Other than direct infringement, three forms of secondary
liability for copyright violations have emerged from the
common law: contributory infringement, vicarious liability, and
inducement theory liability. Contributory liability occurs when
one has knowledge of direct infringement and ―materially
contributes‖ to or assists in the violation.17 Knowledge can be
actual or constructive.18 Knowledge of specific abuses of
copyright is an essential element in establishing such liability;
the mere fact that a product or service is capable of infringing
use is not sufficient to show a violation.19 Next, a material
contribution can be as simple as providing the ―site or facilities‖
where direct infringement takes place, or providing a service or
program without which copyright infringement could not
occur.20
Another kind of secondary liability for copyright
infringement, vicarious liability, concerns the relationship
between direct infringers and the defendant, rather than the
defendant‘s knowledge or facilitation of copyright violations.21
A defendant is vicariously liable for the copyright infringement
of others if he ―profit[s] from direct infringement while
declining to exercise a right to stop or limit‖ these acts.22 Over
the objections of online service providers, courts have held that
almost anything can constitute a financial stake in infringing
activities. In A&M Records v. Napster, Inc.,23 the appellate
court held the mere fact that ―availability of infringing material‖
attracted customers could show the defendant directly benefited
from his users‘ behavior.24 The appellate court in MGM Studios
v. Grokster, Ltd. 25 noted that ―advertising revenue‖ satisfies this
financial element of vicarious liability.26 It does not matter ―how
substantial the benefit is in proportion to a defendant‘s overall
profits,‖ but only that some ―causal relationship between the
infringing activity‖ and the defendant‘s earnings exists.27
16

17 U.S.C. § 501 (2006).
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Gershwin Publ‘g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
18
Id. at 1020.
19
Id. at 1021.
20
Id. at 1022 (citing Fonovisa, Inc., v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259,
264 (9th Cir. 1996)).
21
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913,
930-1 (2005).
22
Id.
23
239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
24
Id. at 1023.
25
380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004).
26
Id. at 1164.
27
Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2004).
17
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Finally, reserving the right to block users‘ access to a service is
sufficient to demonstrate control, satisfying the second prong of
vicarious liability.28
The Supreme Court recently elaborated a third theory for
secondary liability in copyright infringement: inducement. A
defendant is liable for the copyright infringement of third parties
when he intends for others to use his program or service for
such a purpose.29 The defendant shows intent ―by clear
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement [such as] advertisement or solicitation . . .
designed to stimulate others to commit violations.‖30
Answering customer ―requests for help in locating‖ copyrighted
works, ―aiming to satisfy a known source of demand for
copyright infringement,‖ or failing to ―develop filtering tools‖
may all be factors to show intent and, thus, liability for
inducement.31
B. Eligibility Restrictions on Safe-Harbor Provisions for
Online Service Providers
To ―provide certainty for copyright owners and Internet
service providers‖ alike in the murky copyright waters of an
increasingly digitalized world, Congress passed the D.M.C.A. in
1998.32 Title II of the D.M.C.A. includes four safe-harbors
against liability for ISPs.33 Yet, before obtaining protection, an
ISP must show it is eligible by law. The first test is definitional.
Section 512(k) defines ―Internet service provider‖ very broadly,
as any ―provider of online services or network access, or the
operator of [online] facilities.‖34 The second test is one of
policy and implementation. Under § 512(i), the ISP must have
―adopted and reasonably implemented‖ a policy that terminates
―repeat infringers,‖ and it must have informed its subscribers of
28
A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1023. Napster had a policy reserving the
right to block users‘ access for ―any reason whatsoever.‖ Id. at 1023. Lacking such a
policy, other cases have held the mere ability to block access is not sufficient to
demonstrate the right and ability to supervise users consistent with a vicarious
liability scheme. See, e.g., Costar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F.Supp.2d 688,
704 (D. Md. 2001) (―[A]s the concept is used in the DMCA, [control] cannot simply
mean the ability of a service provider to remove or block access to materials.‖).
29
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913,
936-37 (2005).
30
Id. at 937.
31
Id. at 938-39.
32
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998).
33
17 U.S.C. § 512 (a)-(d).
34
17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B). This section includes § 512(k)(1)(A), which
states that any providers ―offering the transmission, routing, or providing of
connections for digital online communications . . . without modification to the content
of the material as sent or received.‖
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this policy.35 In addition, the ISP must not interfere with a
copyright holder‘s steps ―to identify or protect copyrighted
works.‖36
Exactly what § 512(i) entails for ISPs is unclear. The
Congressional Reports on this Section recognize a wide
spectrum between an ―inadvertent‖ copyright violation for no
financial gain and a ―willful‖ violation for a commercial
purpose.37 Those who ―repeatedly or flagrantly . . . disrespect
the intellectual property rights of others‖ are the true target of
§ 512(i).38 Congress never intended to imply a requirement for
an ISP to ―investigate possible infringements, monitor its
service, or make difficult judgments as to whether conduct is or
is not infringing.‖39 As long as an ISP has a ―repeat offender‖
policy and implements it reasonably, the ISP is protected under
§ 512(i)(1)(A).40
Several cases discuss the ―reasonable implementation‖ of
policy. In Ellison v. Robertson,41 a defendant published short
stories to a newsgroup without the author‘s permission. The
stories were then copied to America Online (AOL) USENET
newsgroups as well.42 AOL had a system in place to deal with
repeat infringers. However, it changed the e-mail address
designated to receive complaints from copyright holders without
informing the U.S. Copyright Office or forwarding e-mails from
the old address.43 The Ninth Circuit held that permitting
―notices of potential copyright infringement to fall into a
vacuum and to go unheeded‖ showed evidence of a policy that
was not ―reasonably implemented‖ under § 512(i)(1)(A).44
The Seventh Circuit also dealt with this issue in In re
Aimster Copyright Litig.45 Aimster prevented itself from
gathering data on repeat infringers and terminating their
accounts by allowing users to encrypt file-transfers.46 The court
held this sort of willful blindness did not constitute reasonable
implementation of a ―repeat infringer‖ policy under § 512(i).47
35

17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A).
17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B)-(2).
37
H.R. REP. NO. 105-551(II), at 61 (1998); S. REP. NO. 105-190, supra
note 32, at 52.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
See Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004).
41
357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004).
42
Id. at 1075.
43
Id. at 1080.
44
Id.
45
334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
46
Id. at 655.
47
Id.; see also Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090,
1102 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (affirming the holding in Aimster).
36
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Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit later interpreted Aimster as
holding that a service provider cannot prevent copyright holders
from gathering data on infringement and sending D.M.C.A.
compliant notices under § 512(i).48
Requiring a service
provider to deal with repeat infringers is consistent with
Congressional intent behind this provision.49 Both House and
Senate Reports state that § 512(i) should not be construed in a
way that diminishes the ―protection of privacy rights.‖50
Unfortunately, the law is unclear as to what protection of
consumer privacy means. The statute specifies that an ISP may
obtain safe-harbor even if it does not monitor users or search for
infringing activity, and it links safe-harbor to the ―protection of
privacy.‖51 This is only true to the extent that an ISP does not
interfere with ―standard technical measures‖ used by copyright
holders to ―identify or protect copyrighted works.‖52 Thus,
service providers are left in an ambiguous position. On one
hand, an ISP cannot encrypt files solely to avoid knowledge of
infringing activity.53 On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit‘s
statement that encryption destroys a service provider‘s
protection under § 512(i) seems broader than Congress intended,
so long as that encryption is designed to protect consumer
privacy and not purposefully engineered to hamper copyright
holders from identifying infringing works online.
Fortunately for service providers, ―[a]n infringement policy
need not be perfect; it need only be reasonably implemented.‖54
In Perfect 10 v. CCBill L.L.C.,55 defendants tracked potential
infringers in a spreadsheet after receiving notice of allegedly
infringing behavior.56 The court held this was a reasonable
policy under § 512(i), even though the information was
incomplete and did not list every webmaster‘s name.57 In

48

Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill L.L.C., 488 F.3d 1102, 1109-1110 (9th Cir.
2007) (holding that a policy is only reasonable ―if it does not actively prevent
copyright owners from collecting information needed to issue such notifications‖ and
that ―a repeat infringer policy is not implemented under § 512(i)(1)(A) if the service
provider prevents copyright holders from providing DMCA-compliant notifications‖).
49
H.R. REP. NO. 105-551(II), supra note 37, at 61; S. REP. NO. 105-190,
supra note 32, at 52.
50
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F.Supp.2d 1146, 1176
(C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 105-551(II), supra note 37 and S. REP. NO.
105-190, supra note 32).
51
17 U.S.C. § 512(m).
52
17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2).
53
In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003) .
54
Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1103 (W.D.
Wash. 2004).
55
488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007).
56
Id. at, 1110-11.
57
Id.
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addition, the holding of Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc.58
suggests that a repeat infringer policy might be reasonable, even
if users circumvent it by changing user names and reapplying
for service with the Internet service provider.59 Finally, the
Ninth Circuit has denied any need to discuss how ―reasonable‖
an ISP‘s policy is under 512(i)(1)(A) if the copyright holder has
sent deficient notice.60
In sum, even if an ISP does not track or prevent every
instance of copyright circumvention by its users, a good faith
effort to implement a ―repeat infringer‖ policy under § 512(i)
will likely qualify the provider for safe-harbor treatment under
§§ 512(a-d). It remains unclear whether encrypting data
disqualifies an ISP under § 512(i) by interfering with a
copyright owner‘s ability to discover illegal transfers.
C. Obtaining Safe-Harbor Under § 512(d) by Following a
“Notice and Takedown” Regime
After satisfying the definition of § 512(k) and adopting a
policy compliant with § 512(i) to ban repeat infringers, an ISP
may then qualify for protection under one or more of the safeharbor provisions in Title II of the D.M.C.A. The first safeharbor is intended for service providers that engage in transitory
communications, the second involves system caching, the third
limits liability for a provider who stores information at the
direction of users, and the fourth concerns information location
tools.61 Congress intended these provisions to defend against
existing and evolving theories of copyright liability by limiting a
plaintiff‘s injunctive relief and eliminating monetary relief if an
ISP successfully meets a safe-harbor‘s terms.62 These defenses
do not hinder alternative defenses under the Copyright Act, such
as fair use.63
Under § 512(d), ISPs that use ―information location tools‖
are protected from copyright liability that occurs ―by reason of
the provider referring or linking users to an online location
containing infringing material.‖64
Although large search
engines and directories like Google or Yahoo! seem to be what
Congress had in mind when it passed the law,65 this safe-harbor
58

351 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
Id. at 1104.
60
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill L.L.C., 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007).
61
17 U.S.C. §§ 512(a)-(d).
62
H.R. REP. NO. 105-551(II), supra note 37, at 50; S. REP. NO. 105-190,
supra note 32, at 19-20.
63
17 U.S.C. § 512(l).
64
17 U.S.C. § 512(d).
65
H.R. REP. NO. 105-551(II), supra note 37, at 58; S. REP. NO. 105-190,
supra note 32, at 49.
59
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might apply even if a search engine hosts a small number of
links and has some form of contractual relationship with linked
third-party sites.66 A search engine with multiple features may
be protected by several safe-harbor categories, but § 512(d) only
applies to that portion of the service that utilizes an information
location tool.67
Three conditions must be satisfied before § 512(d) is
satisfied. First, this safe-harbor requires a lack of knowledge,
both actual and constructive, of infringing material or activity
on linked sites.68 Upon gaining such knowledge, a search
engine must ―expeditiously . . . remove, or disable access to‖
infringing material.69 Second, the search engine must not
―receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing
activity,‖ if it ―has the right and ability to control such
activity.‖70 Third, the search engine must comply with ―notice
and takedown‖ procedures, as described in § 512(c)(3).71
The notification procedures in § 512(c) are complex, and it
may be difficult for a search engine to tell when proper notice
has been received. A proper notice must identify allegedly
infringing material or activity that occurs through an ISP and it
must include ―information reasonably sufficient‖ for the ISP to
locate the copyrighted work.72 In the case of a search engine,
this means each notice must list hyperlinks to sites containing
allegedly infringing material.73 The complainant must also
provide a signature, contact information, a good faith statement
that he believes infringement occurred, and a declaration under
penalty of perjury that he is authorized to act on behalf of the
copyright holder.74
All of these requirements are soon undercut by the next
section of the law, which asserts that a notice need only
―comply substantially‖ with these guidelines.75 As long as a
complainant includes contact information and identifies
allegedly infringing links or sites, the burden then moves to the
search engine to contact the copyright holder and obtain ―proper
notice‖ of alleged infringement.76 The receipt of a substantially
compliant notice weighs into a court‘s decision on whether an
66

Perfect 10, Inc., v. CCBill, L.L.C., 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1097-98 (C.D.

Cal. 2004).
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

17 U.S.C. § 512(n).
17 U.S.C. §§ 512(d)(1)(A)-(B).
17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(1)(C).
17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(2).
17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(3).
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii).
17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(3).
17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(3)(A)(i), (iv-vi).
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(i).
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(ii).
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ISP had knowledge of infringing activity.77 Thus, by sending a
―substantially compliant‖ notice, a copyright holder may
generate ―knowledge‖ on the part of a search engine, destroying
the application of its safe-harbor.
Courts are divided as to the meaning of ―substantial
compliance‖ with notice requirements. The Fourth Circuit has
held that a ―representative list‖ of just two websites can
constitute sufficient notice, where ―virtually all the images‖ in
the offending newsgroups showed the plaintiff‘s copyrighted
material, and the newsgroups were ―created for the sole purpose
of publishing‖ the plaintiff‘s copyrighted work.78 Screenshots
of an MP3 message board system displaying potentially
infringing links have also been held to be substantially
compliant notices.79
A less sympathetic plaintiff, however, may receive harsher
treatment from a court. In Perfect 10, the Ninth Circuit held
that 22,185 pages of image printouts were insufficient notice
because they required the defendant to spend great time and
effort combing through files to find infringing material.80 In
addition, the court required the complainant‘s ―good faith‖
declaration that infringing use occurred, and his oath under
penalty of perjury that he was authorized to represent the
copyright holder.81 The plaintiff was not allowed to ―cobble
together‖ sufficient notice from multiple, insufficient
conveyances.82
Similarly, the plaintiff in Hendrickson v. eBay Inc.83
provided eBay with user names but not item numbers where
infringing sales occurred.84 Although eBay attempted to work
with him, the plaintiff refused to provide additional
information.85 The court held that his written notice was
insufficient without a good faith assertion of infringement and a
declaration under penalty of perjury that he was the authorized
copyright holder.86 Both cases gave the technical notice
requirements of § 512(c)(3)(A) more potency in handling
unhelpful plaintiffs.
77
78

17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(i).
ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir.

2001).
79
Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., No. 00 CIV. 4660(SHS), 2002
WL 1997918, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2002).
80
Perfect 10, Inc., v. CCBill, L.L.C., 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1112 (C.D.
Cal. 2004).
81
Id.
82
Id. at 1113.
83
165 F.Supp.2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
84
Id. at 1090-91.
85
Id. at 1085.
86
Id. at 1089.
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For many Internet uses, it is in a search engine‘s interest to
disable access to allegedly infringing links without waiting for
legally proper notice, because the safe-harbor protects those
sites that disable access to infringing material ―expeditiously.‖87
Again, Congress did not intend for ISPs to make complex legal
judgments.88 Instead, the law safeguards search engines and
ISPs that remove access to links quickly, whether or not
copyright violation has truly occurred.89
If a site is unjustly denied access to the Internet, then a siteowner can provide ―counter-notice‖ that complies with the
requirements of § 512(g)(3) and, in addition, possibly have his
services restored.90 However, a mandatory ten-day waitingperiod is imposed on the search engine before it may restore
links to the site, regardless of whether copyright infringement
occurred, providing yet another blockade for site-owners and
Internet users.91 In sum, Title II of the D.M.C.A is problematic
for search engines and Internet users alike. Obtaining safeharbor by following a ―notice and takedown‖ regime can be a
difficult task to accomplish.
III. THE LIMITED UTILITY OF § 512(D)
AGAINST SECONDARY LIABILITY AND THE
PROBLEM OF APPLYING § 512(I) TO SEARCH
ENGINES WITHOUT „USERS‟
A. Liberal Interpretation of § 512(d) Is Necessary to Give
Search Engines Meaningful Protection Against Secondary
Liability for Copyright Infringement
Courts and commentators alike have discovered a pitfall in
the application of the safe-harbor for information location tools
under the D.M.C.A. As mentioned above, for § 512(d) to apply,
search engines must not have ―actual knowledge‖ or awareness
of ―facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is
apparent.‖92 If a search engine has such actual or constructive
knowledge, then it must promptly disable access to the
infringing links to maintain its eligibility under § 512(d).93 In
addition, the search engine must not receive ―financial benefit‖
from third-party infringers where it has a ―right or ability to
control such activity.‖94
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(3).
S. REP. NO. 105-190, supra note 32, at 52.
17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(1).
17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3).
17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(C).
17 U.S.C. §§ 512(d)(1)(A)-(B).
17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(1)(C).
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Given how these provisions echo the knowledge
requirement for contributory liability and the form of vicarious
liability under the common law, some courts have honestly
struggled to understand the meaning of § 512(d). For instance,
the district court in Napster noted that no shelter from
contributory infringement was possible under § 512(d).95 Once
Napster was found contributory liable, any protection afforded
by § 512(d) seemed to disappear. If the defendant had sufficient
―knowledge‖ to satisfy contributory liability, then he also had
sufficient knowledge of infringement to deny the safe-harbor.96
Similarly, the district court in Aimster found that imposition of
vicarious liability on the defendant simultaneously denied the
application of § 512(d).97
Yet Congress clearly intended for the D.M.C.A. to limit
liability for contributory and vicarious infringement claims,98
and most courts are unwilling to hold that the language of a
statute serves no real purpose. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the lower court‘s opinion in Napster concerning
§ 512(d) and contributory infringers,99 and the Seventh Circuit
found an alternative route to denying safe-harbor protection in
Aimster—the appellate court held § 512(i) was not satisfied, so
any discussion of safe-harbors was a moot point.100
Scholars have similarly struggled to grasp the utility of
§ 512(d). Professors Mark Lemley and Anthony Reese agree
that the section ―essentially mirrors‖ the tests for contributory
infringement and vicarious liability101 and therefore confers
―little protection to innovators against secondary liability
claims.‖102 These professors suggest that the ―financial benefit‖
required to establish common law vicarious liability is a slightly
lower standard than the ―direct financial benefit‖ required to
lose protection under § 512(d)(2).103 Likewise, for contributory
infringement purposes, the ‗fatal‘ knowledge imputed by courts
might be a somewhat less stringent standard than the actual or
95

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 919 n.24
(N.D. Cal. 2000).
96
Id.
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In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F.Supp.2d 634, 661 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
98
H.R. REP. NO. 105-551(II), supra note 37, at 50, S. REP. NO. 105-190,
supra note 32, at 20.
99
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1025 (9th Cir.
2001).
100
In re Aimster Copyright Litig., at 655.
101
Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1371-72 (2004).
102
Id. at 1371.
103
Id. at 1372 n.104 (―[T]he directness of the financial benefit a defendant
must have in order to lose the protection of the safe harbor may be somewhat greater
than the somewhat loosened ‗direct financial benefit‘ required by courts in ordinary
cases to hold a defendant vicariously liable.‖).
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constructive knowledge required for a search engine to lose its
safe-harbor treatment under §§ 512(d)(1)(A-B).
Congress has provided some guidance, at least, for the
problematic ―knowledge‖ components of § 512(d)(1). Instead
of requiring the common law standard for constructive
knowledge, a Senate Report suggests that courts should adopt a
―red flag‖ test that contains both subjective and objective
parts.104 Merely asking what a reasonable service provider
should have known, based on facts and circumstances, is not
sufficient in determining liability.105 A court must also test a
defendant‘s ―subjective awareness‖ of those ―facts or
circumstances.‖106
The subjective awareness mental state seems close to actual
knowledge. Under such a standard, an ISP would have no
obligation to seek out copyright infringement, but it would not
qualify for the safe harbor if it ignored ‗red flags‘ of obvious
infringement.107
If websites ―make their illegal purpose
obvious‖ by using ―words such as ‗pirate,‘ ‗bootleg,‘ or slang
terms in their uniform resource locator (URL) and header
information,‖ then a search engine cannot obtain immunity
under § 512(d) after viewing these sites and subsequently
linking to them.108 However, Congress specifically intended
this red flag test to insulate ―online directories prepared by
human editors and reviewers,‖ not automated systems like
Google.109 The red flag test may therefore be of limited
applicability to automated search engines.
The red flag test has not entirely satisfied courts either. The
Ninth Circuit was unwilling to conclude that the mere presence
of certain words in a URL or an online directory necessarily
comprised a red flag of infringing activity or material.110 The
court noted that ―describing photographs as ‗illegal‘ or ‗stolen‘
may be an attempt to increase their salacious appeal, rather than
an admission that the photographs are actually illegal or
stolen.‖111
104

H.R. REP. NO. 105-551(II), supra note 37, at 53; S. REP. NO. 105-190,
supra note 32, at 44, 48.
105
Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1108 (W.D.
Wash. 2004).
106
H.R. REP. NO. 105-551(II), supra note 37, at 53; S. REP. NO. 105-190,
supra note 32, at 44.
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H.R. REP. NO. 105-551(II), supra note 37, at 57; S. REP. NO. 105-190,
supra note 32, at 48.
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Id.
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H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), supra note 37, at 58; S. Rep. No. 105-190,
supra note 32, at 49 (emphasis added).
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Perfect 10, Inc., v. CCBill, L.L.C., 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1114 (C.D.
Cal. 2004).
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A disclaimer may generate a red flag, depending on its
content. In Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill L.L.C.,112 a third-party
disclaimer stated, ―The copyrights of these files remain the
creator's. I do not claim any rights to these files, other than the
right to post them.‖113 Because the third-party allegedly retained
a right to post the images, the appellate court found this
disclaimer insufficient to constitute a red flag of copyright
infringement for an ISP.114 However, in Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Cybernet Ventures, Inc.,115 many third party sites were less
devious in their use of disclaimers, effectively stating,―[W]e do
not hold copyrights for these works.‖116 In this case, ―serious
questions as to Cybernet's constructive knowledge‖ arose.117
Due to these issues with the wording of § 512(d), liberal
interpretation of its terms is necessary to give search engines
meaningful protection against contributory and vicarious
liability for copyright infringement. A strict reading of § 512(d)
will lead to results like the district court holdings in Napster and
Aimster. Rather than treating § 512(d) as mere surplusage,
courts should protect search engines in one of two ways.
First, a court might creatively redefine the terms of § 512(d)
so that the provision will not automatically fail when a search
engine meets common law requirements for secondary
copyright liability. As mentioned above, a court might establish
a more stringent interpretation of ―financial benefit or
knowledge‖ required to lose safe-harbor treatment than to create
vicarious or contributory liability. Alternatively, a court might
use a ―red flag‖ test to add a subjective element to the
constructive knowledge requirement of § 512(d)(1)(B). Then,
even where a search engine is contributorily liable, the safeharbor might still apply, provided the ISP is not subjectively
aware of third-party violations. Admittedly, these subtle,
subjective tests can confuse the issue and unjustly shelter
purposeful rule-breakers. Almost any technicality or play-onwords may be enough to circumvent the ―red flag‖ test of
constructive knowledge.118
A second option for courts is to exercise restraint when
imposing secondary copyright liability on search engines. If a
search engine is less likely to be held liable for secondary
infringement in the first place, the fact that § 512(d) has
112
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ineffective and confusing terms becomes less problematic.
Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com takes this route, narrowing the
common law rule for contributory liability when dealing with
search engines like Google.119 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit
held that Google could only be contributorily liable for linking
to third-party sites with copyrighted images if (1) it had ―actual
knowledge that specific infringing material is available,‖120 (2) it
could have taken ―simple measures to prevent further damage‖
to copyrighted works,121 and (3) it failed to do so.122 Requiring
actual knowledge of specific abuses lightens the load on search
engines, making it harder for plaintiffs to prove contributory
liability. An additional opportunity to avoid liability exists if the
search engine cannot feasibly limit access to infringing works.
Since Google automatically indexes the entire web, it might be
infeasible for Google to take ―simple measures‖ to avoid thirdparty infringement.123 Google would need to completely
redesign its service by implementing ―image-recognition
technology‖ or by inspecting each potential infringing image.124
In sum, scholars, lawyers, and judges are puzzled by how
terms in § 512(d) closely mirror standards for contributory and
vicarious liability in copyright law.
If courts rely on
Congressional intent for the meaning of the safe-harbor
provision, there are a number of ways to distinguish the terms of
§ 512(d) from existing theories of secondary liability. Courts
might consider it slightly more difficult to fail § 512(d) than to
meet common law requirements for secondary liability, thereby
giving the safe-harbor some teeth. Alternatively, courts might
simply reinterpret common law requirements for secondary
liability, thereby making search engines less likely to be
exposed to liability and less likely to need § 512(d) in the first
place.
B. Special Problems in Applying § 512(i) Eligibility
Requirements to Search Engines
The wording of § 512(i) poses a fundamental problem
unique to search engines, and it limits the application of
§ 512(d). Under § 512(i), a search engine is only eligible for
119

Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir.
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Id. (citing A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir.
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Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1172 (citing Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom OnLine Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1375 (N.D.Cal. 1995)).
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1173.
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Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1174.
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safe-harbor treatment if (1) it adopts a policy of terminating
―repeat infringers,‖ (2) the policy is ―reasonably implemented,‖
and (3) the ISP informs ―subscribers and account holders‖ of
this policy.125 Part II of this Note discussed the ―reasonable
implementation‖ of policy. This subsection discusses whether
§ 512(i) should apply to search engines, in light of the italicized,
problematic wording of the statute above.
If a search engine has no ―subscribers and account holders‖
to terminate, but only links, should it still be allowed safeharbor protection, even though it fails to implement a ―repeat
offender‖ policy pursuant to § 512(i)? No court has specifically
decided this issue, but two cases mention the problem. In
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill L.L.C.,126 the district court confirmed
that ―the focus of § 512(i) is on infringing users rather than on
content.‖127 The Ninth Circuit also espoused this concept in
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com., Inc.128 In holding that Google
could not be vicariously liable for third-party infringement of
websites it linked to, the court distinguished Google from
Napster:
Napster had a closed system requiring user registration,
and could terminate its users' accounts… By contrast,
Google cannot stop any of the third-party websites from
reproducing, displaying, and distributing unauthorized
copies of Perfect 10's images because that infringing
conduct takes place on the third-party websites. Google
cannot terminate those third-party websites or block
their ability to “host and serve infringing full-size
images” on the Internet.129
Because of this inability to terminate ‗users,‘ Google argued
that it should be exempt from the eligibility requirements of
§ 512(i).130
Admittedly, Google now disables access to
infringing links upon receiving proper notice, and it has adopted
a policy compliant with § 512(i) of the D.M.C.A.131 At the time
it was sued by Perfect 10, however, Google had not yet taken
these measures, and the issue remains unresolved.
125

17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
340 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
127
Id., at 1088 (emphasis added).
128
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One commentator suggests exempting search engines from
the prerequisites of § 512(i) whenever they ―lack subscribers
and account holders.‖132 Otherwise, search engines might not
be eligible for safe-harbor protection at all, for, without
―subscribers or account holders[,] [they] simply cannot fulfill
the initial eligibility requirements.‖133 It might be safer to
exempt search engines entirely from § 512(i), since Congress
did not intend to be overly harsh to ISPs. 134
This Note contends that a total exemption for search engines
from § 512(i) would not be in the spirit of the law either. On its
face, the D.M.C.A. explicitly requires all ISPs to comply with
§ 512(i) before obtaining safe-harbor.135 Congress intended to
create ―strong incentives for service providers and copyright
owners to cooperate‖ and work together against copyright
infringement online.136 A ―repeat infringer‖ termination policy
follows Congressional intent to force service providers to think
about the consequences of receiving a ―notice and takedown‖
request ahead of time.
This Note contends that Google has already provided an
excellent solution. It has established a written policy of
disabling access to infringing links upon receiving proper
notice, and it has posted this policy to its own site.137 Since
Google‘s ―subscribers and account holders‖ consist almost
entirely of Internet users, simply posting this policy to its
website should satisfy any user-notification requirements under
§ 512(i). In addition, the written policy clarifies for copyright
holders and Internet users, what steps Google will take upon
receiving a ―notice and takedown‖ request.
In sum, although § 512(i) technically requires ISPs to adopt
a policy of terminating repeat infringers, not links, it seems
reasonable to interpret this loosely in the case of search engines.
Despite the broad, anonymous customer base of search engines,
the user-notification requirement of § 512(i) may still be
satisfied when the search engine posts its policy on its main
search page. After that, it is up to Internet users to inform
themselves.

132
Craig W. Walker, Note, Application of the DMCA Safe Harbor
Provisions to Search Engines, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, 41 (2004).
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IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO “NOTICE AND
TAKEDOWN” PROBLEMS
A. Common Criticisms and Present Abuses of the
“Notice and Takedown” Regime
Currently, the ―notice and takedown‖ provisions in the
D.M.C.A. favor copyright holders and ISPs over end-users. An
Internet user may provide ―counter-notice‖ to the ISP if he
believes a provider mistakenly removed or disabled access to his
work.138 Whether copyright infringement actually occurred or
not, the law imposes a mandatory ten-day waiting period on an
ISP before restoring access.139 Furthermore, once a copyright
holder files an action in court, an ISP must persist in preventing
access to allegedly infringing online content in order to maintain
its eligibility for safe-harbor treatment.140 Critics argue that this
creates ―impermissible restrictions on free speech by effectively
granting temporary restraining orders prior to any determination
by a court.‖141
Another common critique of the notice and takedown
procedures is that ISPs have no incentive to verify the
authenticity of the notices they receive. For an ISP, it is safest
to ―respond by treating all complaints of infringements as actual
infringements, overzealously enforcing copyright.‖142 In fact,
one commentator notes that ―[t]he lack of a subscription
relationship between search engines and alleged infringers
suggests that search engines will be more likely than other types
of service providers to overzealously remove content.‖143
Because search engines often have no account holders or
subscribers, there is hardly any economic incentive for a search
engine to resist removing allegedly infringing links.144
Moreover, a search engine lacking a close relationship with its
users might find it hard ―to provide adequate notice to alleged
infringers so that they have the opportunity to defend their
rights‖ by sending a counter-notice.145
A recent study performed by Jennifer Urban and Laura
138
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Quilter on takedown notices substantiates scholars‘ fears about
the ―overzealous‖ removal of content.146 Urban and Quilter
analyzed over 900 notices stored at Chilling Effects,147 an online
depository for takedown notices from various search engines,
predominately Google.148 The study showed that significant
abuses of the notice and takedown process occurred – many
senders used D.M.C.A. notices ―to create leverage in a
competitive marketplace, to protect rights not given by
copyright (or perhaps any other law), and to stifle criticism,
commentary, and fair use.‖149 To Urban and Quilter, this result
was not surprising. The simplicity of sending infringement
notices and ―the weak remedies available for spurious claims
create an irresistible temptation for the upset or unscrupulous‖
to furnish ISPs with faulty or erroneous notices.150 The volume
of defective claims is what most surprised the authors. Over
22.5% of ―competitor-related notices sent to Google were
substantively questionable.‖151 In addition, many senders
displayed confusion over the extent of their rights, demanding
that ISPs police online content or remove a ―high-level URL . . .
just to get at one incorporated image file [or] overly-lengthy
quotation.‖152
Other commentators note similar abuses of and questionable
results in the notice and takedown process. Copyright holders
push ISPs ―to cut off subscribers who are accused of committing
infringement [rather than] simply blocking access to allegedly
infringing content, as the law requires.‖153 Congress intended
for repeat infringers to suffer a ―realistic threat of losing
[Internet] access,‖154 yet an ISP‘s censorship of users based
solely on a notice sent by a copyright holder goes beyond the
scope of Congressional intent. Courts, not copyright holders,
decide when a violation truly occurs, so notice alone should not
prevent an Internet user from accessing the World Wide Web.
The notice and takedown provisions are also used to
suppress criticism and debate. In 2002, for instance, the Church
146
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of Scientology requested that Google disable links to third-party
websites that used copyrighted church material in a critical
manner.155 The site owner contended that his webpage made
―fair use‖ of the church material and that copyright law
protected it.156 Although Google initially removed access to the
site, it soon restored the links, and the website became more
popular than ever due to this episode.157 The foreign site owner
noted, however, that if Google had not restored access, ―he
would not file a counter-complaint because it would put him
under the jurisdiction of United States law.‖158 Anecdotes like
this highlight troubling issues of ―fair use‖ under copyright law
and the misuse of infringement notifications to stifle critical
social commentary.
While this is not an exhaustive list of the ways copyright
holders abuse or exploit notice and takedown procedures, it
illustrates some of the existing problems with the D.M.C.A.
provisions. The law serves copyright holders‘ interests by
providing a ―quick and inexpensive way to remove material that
they believe is infringing [and] ISPs also will flourish because
they need not fear liability for the acts of their subscribers.‖159
Internet users fall in the middle, without much protection for
their rights.160
B. Potential Revisions to Wording in the D.M.C.A.
There have been many proposed solutions to problems with
the D.M.C.A. Some have suggested a system of compulsory
levies or an alternative dispute resolution system as a better
solution to the problems of § 512.161 Others suggest doing away
with the D.M.C.A. entirely and embracing Digital Rights
Management instead.162 Some ISPs, like AT&T, are forming
contractual relationships with copyright holders where the ISP
agrees to filter Internet content by upload.163
155
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To solve the problematic ―knowledge‖ provisions of
§ 512(d) discussed above, one commentator suggests that search
engines should be completely immune from contributory
liability claims.164 Search engines would only be exposed to
direct or vicarious liability ―in extraordinary circumstances
where a search engine's conduct is particularly active and
egregious.‖165 Furthermore, ISPs may be in a better position to
deal with users‘ behavior. The existence of a contractual
relationship between an Internet user and his ISP may allow the
typical ISP to control end-user behavior more effectively than a
search engine.166
Still, this solution seems contrary to Congressional intent.
Both House and Senate Reports note that the D.M.C.A. shields
qualifying search engines ―from liability for all monetary relief
for… vicarious and contributory infringement.‖167 Search
engines like Google are one of the first tools Internet users
employ to locate information. In Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, the
appellate court refused to discount the possibility of
contributory infringement for search engines, stating that:
There is no dispute that Google substantially assists
websites to distribute their infringing copies to a
worldwide market and assists a worldwide audience of
users to access infringing materials. We cannot discount
the effect of such a service on copyright owners, even
though Google's assistance is available to all websites,
not just infringing ones.168
Without an incentive for search engines to remove or disable
access to infringing links, copyright holders would be at a
further disadvantage.
This Note proposes a simpler means of protecting Internet
users and search engines. To guard against the ―upset or
unscrupulous‖ sender of infringement notices,169 the law might
simply require that copyright holders post online notices. A
takedown request would not be ―effective‖ under § 512(c)(3)
until it is displayed in a designated online database. This would
help make the ―notice and takedown‖ process more transparent
to Internet users and should discourage copyright holders from
164
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making erroneous claims.
Chilling Effects already exists as one such online repository
for takedown notices. Currently, Google informs its users
whenever it disables a link because of a takedown notice, sends
a copy of the takedown request to Chilling Effects, and directs
the end-user to view the letter for further information.170 While
Google‘s efforts are commendable, this Note contends that the
burden of filing such a takedown notice should be on the
copyright holder, not the search engine. Under the current law,
a copyright holder is not required to send notice171 or publicly
file it. However, the copyright holder should not be allowed to
use a takedown notice as evidence of the search engine's
knowledge and awareness of the facts and circumstances
without public filing.
Another simple revision to the D.M.C.A. that would make
its terms more equitable concerns the ―good faith‖ statement
copyright holders must have in their takedown request. The law
states that a notice is not complete without ―a statement that the
complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material
. . . is not authorized by the copyright owner.‖172 However, to
form a proper counter-notice, an Internet user must state ―under
penalty of perjury that the subscriber has a good faith belief that
the material was removed or disabled as a result of mistake or
misidentification.‖173
The law gives copyright holders
preferential treatment over Internet users when it comes to
notice versus counter-notice.
Due to the above wording, there is little downside for a
copyright holder who sends multiple notice and takedown
requests, even when the allegedly infringing activity or material
is unclear. The law specifies that material misrepresentation of
infringement may expose the copyright holder to ―damages,
including costs and attorney‘s fees, incurred by the alleged
infringer,‖174 but this brings small comfort to an innocent
Internet user whose work is removed due to mistake,
misidentification, or purposeful misuse of the notice and
takedown procedures. Additionally, the user would still need to
prove his case in court to win damages, and a typical Internet
user may not have the resources to litigate.
The law further discourages ―counter-notice‖ requests by
170
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forcing an Internet user to take an oath under penalty of perjury
before his materials may be restored online. It remains unclear
why Congress decided to expose Internet users to potential jailtime when sending a counter-notice, while copyright holders
merely must hold a ―good faith‖ belief. This Note contends that
the notice and counter-notice requirements should mirror each
other. If the law requires only a good faith belief of
infringement for copyright holders to send notice, then the law
should also allow Internet users to send counter-notifications
with only a good faith belief. Lowering the burden on Internet
users might encourage them to send counter-notice, allowing
innocent online material or activity to remain in place.
Copyright holders may argue that such a provision lowers
the burden for unjustified Internet users who are trying to
subvert the system. However, changing the D.M.C.A. counternotice provision would not prevent determined infringers from
violating copyright laws any more than the current provision
does. This Note merely contends that the burden should be
equal for both copyright holders and Internet users, requiring
only a ―good faith‖ statement that material or activity is noninfringing.
V. CONCLUSION
As technology changes, the law must change accordingly.
Congress intended for the D.M.C.A. to strike a balance between
the important interests of copyright holders and the continued
productivity of ISPs.175 However, as the Internet continues to
expand and change in ways Congress did not predict in 1998,
both copyright holders and search engines grow increasingly
dissatisfied with the D.M.C.A. Lawsuits like Warner Bros.
Records v. SeeqPod demonstrate that a company may not be
immune from liability merely because it markets itself as a
search engine. Moreover, in their study of takedown notices,
Urban and Quilter noted that ―the movie and music industries
combined were responsible for only . . . 3% of the § 512(d)
notices,‖176 a statistic which ―suggests that the copyright
industry‘s concerns about piracy are currently not welladdressed by the notice-and-takedown process.‖177 Some
copyright holders feel the safe-harbor approach is not good
enough. For instance, U2‘s manager, Paul McGuinness says,
―The safe harbor approach under which ISPs are not held
175
176
177

H.R. REP. NO. 105-551(II), supra note 37, at 21.
Urban & Quilter, supra note 146, at 651.
Id. at 652.
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accountable for criminal activity enabled by their services . . .
has been enormously damaging to content owners and
developing artists.‖178
Due to the vital importance of search engines in the online
world today, effective safe-harbor treatment for information
location tools is essential. As one judge has stated, ―[i]t is by
now a truism that search engines such as Google Image Search
provide great value to the public.‖179 To allow service providers
to continue developing and adding new features or innovative
methods of file-searching, courts should afford a wide latitude
of protection to search engines under § 512(d).
Unfortunately, confusion over the meaning of terms in
§ 512(d) and ―the more demanding eligibility requirements
under this safe harbor provision create a disincentive for ISPs to
characterize themselves under this provision.‖180 This Note
contends that § 512(d) is a meaningful provision in light of
Congressional intent and that courts should liberally interpret
the terms of the law to shelter search engines. Also, § 512(i)
should apply to search engines, despite a potential lack of
―subscribers and account holders,‖181 because it is important that
ISPs retain their eligibility for safe-harbor treatment under the
law.
Finally, there is potential for abuse of the ―notice and
takedown‖ provisions, which could potentially suppress Internet
users‘ rights. Search engines seem likely to comply with the
letter of the law rather than its spirit, overzealously removing
content. This Note has suggested several potential solutions to
the weak points of the notice and takedown provisions of Title II
of the D.M.C.A. In the long run, stability and transparency in
the law will benefit service providers, copyright holders, and
Internet users alike.
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